Double Standards? Understanding China’s Diplomatic Support for

Pakistan’s Cross-Border Terrorists by Wolf, Siegfried O.
 On December 30, 2016, China once again blocked India’\s attempt to get 
the United Nations (UN) to list Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) chief Masood 
Azhar as a terrorist. The move took place despite clear indications that the 
Pakistan-based JeM under the leadership of Azhar is responsible for 
several attacks on Indian soil, like the Parliament terror attack (2001) or 
the Pathankot airbase attack. In this context, it is remarkable that JeM has 
already been blacklisted by the 15 members of the UN Security Council 
(UNSC), but not the terrorist leader himself. Due to the persistent 
‘technical holds’ enforced by China, Azhar did not get listed as a 
designated terrorist under the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da'esh, the militant 
Islamic State/IS group) and Al Qaida Sanctions Committee’ of the UNSC. 
All individuals and entities listed by this UN Committee are subject to 
international sanctions. Subsequently, a listening of Mr Azhar as terrorist 
would pressure Pakistan to impose an asset freeze and travel ban on him. 
In this context, it is significant to point out that China was the only 
member of the UNSC which blocked India’s application, all others 
supported New Delhi’s bid. These persistent extensions of the ‘technical 
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hold’ on India’s listening application, flimsily arguing that there are “different views” in this 
matter and the extensions “will allow more time for the committee to deliberate on the matter 
and for relevant parties to have further consultations”, are not merely a “hidden veto” but show 
Beijing’s clear support for certain Pakistani based terrorists.  
Consequently, many observers are describing this ‘diplomatic drive’ as a reflection of the 
prevalence of double standards in China’s fight against terrorism. However, it is doubtless 
surprising as China has been greatly affected by the threats of terrorism and has declared 
opposition to all forms of terrorism. As such, Chinese diplomatic protection for Masood Azhar is 
rising severe questions: Why is Beijing shielding Pakistani-based terrorists?  
The Larger Context of China’s diplomatic drive for Pakistan 
The rationale of China’s ongoing diplomatic support for Pakistani based cross-border terrorists 
has many facets. Therefore, one must see Beijing’s latest ‘block’ at the UN to name Masood 
Azhar as terrorist in the larger picture: China has emerged as the principal supporter of 
Pakistan’s longstanding policy of sponsoring militant groups, and has continuously shows it is 
willing to use its diplomatic resources to defend that policy at the international level. Against this 
background, Beijing’s protection for Mr Azhar is only one element of a major Chinese strategic 
campaign to provide Islamabad with diplomatic patronage. This includes (among other things) 
informal ‘lobbying work’ to prevent that Pakistan gets listed by individual governments as state-
sponsor of terrorism, especially in the US or in Europe. For example, Pakistan almost faced UN 
charges under the George H.W. Bush presidency, and in 1993, Clinton’s administration put 
Pakistan on a watch list of state sponsors of terrorism due to the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) 
open involvement in training Kashmiri terrorists. In order to appease Washington, the army 
moved some militant training camps out of Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, leading Washington to 
withdraw its name from the list of state-sponsors of terrorism suspects. Later on, their 
dependence on Pakistan’s collaboration in the context of the NATO/US engagement in 
Afghanistan assured that Pakistan did not got re-added to the list, at least for the following two 
decades. However, last year there were again serious attempts to declare Pakistan as “state 
sponsor of terrorism” by some US lawmakers, attempting (unsuccessfully) to pass a bill called, 
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Pakistan State Sponsor of Terrorism Designation Act. This would not only have political and 
economic consequences for Pakistan (f. ex. the EU could reassess the granting of the GSP-Plus 
Status that gives special benefits in Trade while the US might question financial, technical and 
military assistance) but also give a severe blow to China’s international image and its claim to be 
a trustworthy and ‘responsible world power’. This is gaining significance, since Pakistan must 
be seen as a ‘quasi-ally’ of China. Furthermore, like already indicated above, China tries to 
undermine all attempts by India to officially name Pakistan a state-sponsor of terrorism in 
international forums like BRICS or the Heart of Asia conference. In this context, Beijing is 
successfully using its improved relationship with Moscow. Subsequently, Russia increasingly 
supports China’s diplomatic backing of Pakistan on the international stage. In this regard, China 
is also increasingly involving Pakistan in trilateral and multilateral dialogues (f. ex. China-
Russia-Pakistan talks) regarding regional cooperation and security in the Afghanistan-Pakistan 
region and Central Asia in order to end Islamabad’s isolation. Besides cross-border terrorism, 
another example of Chinese support for Pakistan’s stand vis-à-vis India within international 
organizations is China’s blocking of India’s application to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
(NSG). 
Securing Chinese Interests in Pakistan 
Another dimension of China’s blocking of naming Azhar a terrorist, is the threat that anti-Indian 
terror groups like JeM turn against the Pakistani state. This would have dangerous implications 
for China too, especially for Chinese investments and development initiatives in the South Asian 
country, first and foremost its projects related to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). 
As China is not only Pakistan’s ‘all-weather-friend’, but has also been named a target of global 
Jihad by international terror groups like al-Qaeda, Islamic State, or the East Turkestan Islamic 
Movement (ETIM), allegedly as a reprisal for anti-Muslim (Uighur) policies in its western 
Xinjiang province. Overall, China is not interested in additional confrontation with militant 
Islamist groups. Consequently, Beijing is not only supporting but most likely also encouraging 
Islamabad to act only against elements which are perceived as an immediate threat to Pakistani 
state interests. In brief, Pakistan and China are trying to appease and not to provoke cross-border 
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terrorists. Having said this, it also becomes apparent that China is expecting for its diplomatic 
support some trade-offs/rewards from Pakistan, namely successful measures to undermine any 
attempt of terrorists operating from Pakistani soil challenging China’s internal security, territorial 
integrity and other national interests, or political support for Beijing’s ‘One China Policy’. 
Reshuffling of International Relations 
China’s diplomatic support for Azhar must also be seen in the context of an ongoing shift in 
international relations, which relates to the end of the post-World War II bipolar world order, but 
also in recent failures and lacking ‘problem-solving capabilities’ of major multi-lateral regimes. 
This has caused states to increasingly rely on bilateral relations and China’s foreign policy 
towards Pakistan reflects this current trend. Several instances of this can be identified:  
- The redefinition of China’s role in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region from a bystander to a 
stakeholder; 
-  Beijing moving from hidden support to openly supporting Pakistan, including the 
departure from its ‘neutrality’ on the ‘Kashmir dispute’ by officially siding with 
Islamabad against New Delhi’s claim over disputed territory (namely areas which are 
under Islamabad’s control but claimed by India like Pakistan-administered Kashmir and 
Gilgit-Baltistan) 
Between Cause and Consequence: India-China Rivalry 
Finally, there is no doubt that the India-China rivalry might also be a factor as China chooses to 
support Pakistan based terrorists. In this context, Beijing’s major development projects, like 
‘One Belt, One Road’ to link China with Europe, the Middle East, and via numerous physical 
infrastructure projects and other connectivity projects (pipelines, communications), makes it 
clear that China increasingly identifies Afghanistan as part of an area of its economic, security 
and geopolitical interest. As such, an Indian engagement in the region is perceived as a 
disrupting factor in securing its own and Pakistan’s interests.  
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India’s rationale  
New Delhi wants the internationally community to designate Pakistan as a state-sponsor of 
terrorism in general and recognise its involvement in the support of several terrorist activities on 
its soil in particular. This would not only help to create awareness of the problem of cross-border 
terrorism and Pakistan’s role in it, but also it would help ending the ‘impunity’ regarding its 
respective sponsorship. In this context, New Delhi would most likely expect international 
sanctions and other forms of pressure. Furthermore, branding Pakistan as state-sponsor of 
terrorism would help to justify Indian military action against terrorists on Pakistan soil, and/or in 
areas under Pakistani administration. In other words, it would legitimate cross-border military 
action and the use of force. Besides this, it would also create a certain sense of justice among the 
victims of Pakistani’s based terrorists in India.  
India and China: No common ground in counter-terrorism 
By observing the origin and development of terrorism in China and India, it is astonishing that - 
despite the fact that both countries face foreign supported Islamist militancy - New Delhi and 
Beijing are unable or unwilling to develop a comprehensive joint-anti terror policy. Traditionally, 
due to its policies of non-interference, China is following its own, unilateral way in counter-
terrorism. However, in early 2016, Beijing enacted a new anti-terror law which empowers 
Chinese security forces to take part in counter-terrorism activities abroad. This might finally 
promote a more cooperative, international approach to counter-terrorism among Beijing’s 
security circles. In this context, first steps are initiated with Pakistan, Russia and Central Asian 
nations towards closer security and anti-terror collaboration. However, we should expect 
cooperation with India to counter Islamist terrorism will remain limited in the near future. The 
main reason for this is the increasing potential  confrontation between Beijing and Washington 
on one side and growing India-US ties on the other side. Here, the recent anti-US stand of 
Philippines President Duterte and call to align with China, or the China-US diplomatic row in 
the aftermath of a phone call of Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen with US-President Elect 
Trump, are not only pointing to an ongoing tectonic shifts in Asia’s great power relations but 
also at an increased polarisation and formation of new hostile ‘camps’ within the extended 
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region. With this in mind, it appears unlikely that Chinese counter-terrorist concepts would 
include the US or India in the near future. In contrast, all recent Chinese initiatives in counter-
terrorism, especially in Afghanistan and Central Asia, are appearing to sideline the US (including 
NATO member states, besides Turkey). Beijing increasingly perceives the US as a geopolitical 
rival, it seems that it prefers not to cooperate with New Delhi, and in some cases even acts 
against Indian interests in counter-terrorism. Other than the limited economic cooperation, 
infrastructure connectivity, and the current mutual distrust between China and Russia, in 2016 it 
has become obvious that Moscow and Beijing are willing to deepen cooperation, which would 
also include Central Asia and to a certain degree Iran and Turkey. Currently it looks like China is 
trying to build a new parallel security system in Asia (alongside the Asian part of OBOR), which 
will differ significantly from the formal alliance of NATO, rather it will be a “quasi-alliance” 
system, mainly based on bilateral or trilateral arrangements. Such a new defence and security 
arrangement could have similar features like the decade-old US security system in the Asia-
Pacific region. However, for obvious reason it will not help to work towards more Sino-Indian 
security cooperation. 
Final Thoughts  
In sum, one should address the puzzle of whether Beijing’s diplomatic support for Pakistan-
based jihadists functions as a catalyst for cross-border terrorism. While China is not directly 
encouraging Pakistan to continue their sponsorship of cross-border terrorism, it also supports 
Pakistan’s policy to fight against militants that target its interests, especially groups perceived as 
a threat for Chinese investments and CPEC. This will also include, at least the endorsement of 
Pakistan policy not ‘to touch’ cross-border militant groups. Furthermore, Beijing will most likely 
not intervene in Pakistan’s sponsorship of terrorists operating in Afghanistan and India. Any 
measures against such groups or the withdrawal of support will be perceived as hostile act by 
these jihadists. In this context, it is remarkable that the latest trilateral cooperation initiatives of 
Russia, China, and Pakistan on how to bring stability and peace to Afghanistan identifying IS as 
the major threat and not the pro-Pakistan Taliban and other militant groups like the Haqqani 
Network.  
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